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The negotiation leading to the historic Lausanne Peace Treaty provides a setting for exploring 
the impacts of different power configurations on bargaining behavior. Symmetric and asymmetric 
coalition structures existed on two key issues in the talks, passage through the straits and the 
question of civil rights for minorities. A content analysis of the transcripts showed some 
differences in bargaining behavior between the two power structures. These structures were 
simulated and compared to a third condition, bilateral negotiations between parties of equal 
power. Opposing negotiators in the symmetric parties condition were more satisfied with the 
outcome, achieved faster resolutions, disagreed less, and made fewer competitive statements 
during the discussions than negotiators from these countries in the coalition conditions. Both 
similarities and differences were found in the comparison between the processes and outcomes 
in the actual and simulated negotiations. The results have implications for designing structures 
that improve negotiations and illustrate some advantages of experimental simulation. 
KEYWORDS:   negotiating behavior; alternative power structures; experimental simulation; 
process analysis; perceptions and attitudes; Lausanne peace negotiations. 
The historic Lausanne Peace Treaty marked the end of the post-World War 
I conflicts between allied forces and Turkish nationalists. The treaty was 
negotiated at a conference held in Lausanne (Switzerland) from November 
1922 to July 1923. The parties consisted of the allied powers, the Soviet 
Union, and Turkey. They negotiated issues in three "baskets": territorial and 
military questions, the legal status of foreigners, and economic and financial 
problems. From these baskets, two issues in particular provide an opportunity 
to test hypotheses about the role of power differences in negotiation. 
The discussion of territorial questions highlighted conflicts between Greece 
and Turkey over passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits. 
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sat at separate tables. Then Don asked everyone to go to the table representing 
the session they were least likely to attend! He was teaching us very con-
cretely to open ourselves to truly new ideas. 
When his NASAGA board term ran out this fall, Don chose not to run 
again, but he came anyway to the meeting of the new board, his presence 
helping us stay centered. "It is time for new people to take up the work," he 
told us. Yet, the last time I talked with him, just a few weeks before he died, 
he was considering holding the 1998 conference in Ypsilanti/Ann Arbor— 
20 years after he had first done so (at the University of Louisville in Kentucky). 
"My challenge to my colleagues is to take gaming as seriously as we once 
did," were the last words of Don's Silver Anniversary article. His challenge 
rings in my heart. 
You can reach Don's wife, Valerie, whom he married in 1983, and their 
sons Adam (11) and Joel (9) at 2907 Baylis Dr., Ann Arbor, MI 48108, USA; 
telephone 313-971-8158. He is also survived by his mother, Vera Kill, and 
his sisters, Alia Griffin and Miriam Grut, all of Los Angeles, CA; and his 
brother, Vern Ifill of New Orleans, LA. 
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Positions taken by the Greek negotiators were supported by the allied 
coalition, whereas those taken by the Turkish delegates were supported by 
the Soviet representatives. The situation was symmetrical in terms of power; 
each minor country was aligned with major powers in the discussion. Issues 
concerning minorities were of less interest to the Soviet delegation, leading 
to an asymmetric confrontation between the weaker Turkish negotiators and 
the stronger allied coalition. The two issues provide a contrast between 
alternative power configurations: symmetric in the case of the straits question 
and asymmetric on the minorities issue. These differences can be analyzed 
for impacts on negotiating behavior. 
(A)Symmetry in International 
Negotiation: Some Hypotheses 
Symmetrical and asymmetrical power configurations are important as-
pects of multilateral diplomacy. Analyses by Hopmann and associates docu-
ment the impacts of structural asymmetries on the interactions within several 
negotiations, including the Seabeds Denuclearization Treaty (Hopmann, 
1974), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Hopmann, 
1978), the UN Special Session on Disarmament (King, 1979), and the Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions talks (Hopmann, 1977). These analyses 
illuminate the prevalence of coercive tactics, in the form of commitments and 
threats or vetoes and text bracketing, used by the stronger parties to elicit 
compliance by the weaker delegations. In these cases, the superpowers used 
their threat potential by acting together to preserve their joint interest in 
domination over their blocs and the nonaligned states. In contrast to stronger 
parties, weaker bargainers have been found to exhibit softer negotiating styles 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Husbands, 1977), behave more submissively 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975), emphasize their share of the joint gains (Haskel, 
1974), attach irrelevant demands or riders to their negotiating positions 
(Druckman, 1986; Haskel, 1974), and be less effective in encouraging their 
stronger opponents to reciprocate concessions (Michener, Fleishman, Vaske, 
& Statza, 1975) or conciliatory gestures (Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1977). Asym-
metrical power relations result in asymmetrical strategies, styles, and moves 
leading often to outcomes that favor the stronger more than the weaker party. 
These findings support the observation of Stern, Bagozzi, and Dholakia 
(1977) that diplomacy "would probably function better in situations where 
there are mutual dependence and symmetric power relationships" (p. 370). 
Symmetry is a condition for compromise outcomes insofar as the parties 
reciprocate each other's concessions. Komorita and Barnes (1969) found that 
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pairs with equal power reached agreement more often, required fewer trials 
to do so, and made larger concessions than those with unequal power.1 
Symmetry may, however, lead also to stalemate as each side is reluctant to 
offer any concessions. This is especially likely when the parties share 
competitive intentions as shown by the results of experiments reviewed by 
Rubin and Brown (1975, pp. 244-247). 
The studies suggest the hypothesis that equal or symmetrical power 
among negotiating parties is likely to result in more cooperative choices and 
better outcomes than unequal or asymmetrical power among the parties. The 
research to date also indicates that it makes a difference which side of the 
asymmetry a party is on. Negotiators face a "toughness dilemma," which is 
described by Zartman (1991): 
The tougher a negotiator, the greater her chance of getting an agreement close 
to her position, but the less her chance of getting an agreement at all, whereas 
the weaker a negotiator, the greater his chance of getting an agreement, but the 
less his chance of getting that agreement close to his position. (p. 68) 
This is a fundamental dilemma of negotiating behavior related to the power 
positions of the parties. For the stronger party, the choice is between a favor-
able agreement or stalemate. For the weaker party, the choice is between an 
unfavorable agreement or stalemate. At issue is how a weaker party can improve 
its outcomes in negotiation. This study is designed to address this issue. 
The trend toward multilateralism in international diplomacy presents 
opportunities for weaker states to improve their outcomes. They can "equal-
ize" the power balance by aligning with stronger partners in negotiation. 
Multilateralism can, however, also work to their disadvantage if, for example, 
they are isolated and must confront stronger opponents. The Lausanne talks 
illustrate these two power configurations, both of which are commonly found 
in multilateral negotiations, namely, weak nations aligned with stronger partners 
in opposition to a similarly configured coalition and alone in opposition to 
stronger nations. Based on the earlier results, reviewed above, the symmet-
rical configuration would be expected to produce more satisfactory outcomes 
than the asymmetrical structure. The reciprocity needed to obtain agree-
ments is more likely to occur between equal-power opponents. The contrast-
ing structures, symmetrical and asymmetrical coalitions, can be compared 
in analyses of the actual negotiation transcripts and in a simulation of the 
conference. 
It may also be the case, however, that the intracoalition bargaining needed 
to develop positions may pose problems for the intercoalition negotiations. 
Analyses by Hopmann (1974, 1978) and by King (1976, 1979) showed that 
the intra-alliance bargaining can delay the interalliance talks as well as increase 
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the competitive posturing of parties in both (or all) the alliances. Parties 
within each alliance must reconcile their differences in order to present a 
common position in the negotiations. One result of this process is enhanced 
alliance cohesion, which has been shown to increase threat perceptions, 
leading to further cohesion and competitive posturing in the interalliance 
talks. (For discussions of the relationship between alliance cohesion and 
threat perception, see Holsti, Hopmann, & Sullivan, 1973; Ward, 1982; and 
Druckman & Hopmann, 1991.) Thus bargaining between symmetrical coa-
litions may be less effective than bargaining between single parties. 
With regard to the weaker parties in a coalition, the research suggests that 
they have limited influence over the positions adopted by the more powerful 
members. Their concerns about possible condominium relationships between 
powerful members of the opposing coalitions may cause them to be competi-
tive in the intercoalition talks (Druckman & Hopmann, 1991; Hopmann, 
1977). In addition to the cohesion pressures noted above, membership in a 
coalition may serve to bolster their confidence in defending their positions. 
These factors are likely to cause weak parties to be more competitive in 
coalition talks than when they negotiate alone with other single parties. 
Weak parties may be able to improve their outcomes by negotiating with 
other weak parties in bilateral conferences. Komorita and Barnes (1969) 
found that negotiators in the low equal-power condition were more effective 
overall than those in the high equal-power condition. Other experiments 
showed that the smaller the total amount of power in the negotiating system, 
the more effective the negotiations. Of the 17 studies reviewed by Rubin and 
Brown (1975), 11 found that low equal-power pairs negotiated more effec-
tively than high equal-power pairs. 
Recent comparative case analyses showed that conference size was an 
important influence on process and outcomes. Bilateral conferences between 
weak nations produced more efficient processes and stable, binding outcomes 
than the multilateral conferences in which those nations were involved 
(Druckman, in press). Outcomes may benefit the strong coalition partners 
more than the weak parties in multilateral negotiations; the weak parties risk 
being exploited by their stronger partners. Further clarification for these 
hypothesized effects is provided by this study. 
These studies suggest another hypothesis. This is that negotiations be-
tween weak parties of equal or symmetrical power are likely to result in more 
cooperative interactions and better outcomes than negotiations between 
coalitions of equal or symmetrical power. 
Taken together, the hypotheses suggest that symmetrical negotiations 
between weak parties are likely to be more effective than talks between 
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coalitions of parties with equal power. The symmetrical coalition structure 
produces delays and competitive posturing by the parties. The symmetrical 
talks between coalitions may, however, be more effective than negotiations 
between unequal-power or asymmetrical parties. The asymmetrical structure 
works to the disadvantage of the weaker parties, making it harder for them 
to achieve satisfactory agreements. 
This study was designed to test these hypotheses by comparing the effects 
of alternative structures on negotiating behavior. A simulation was designed 
to reproduce certain aspects of the Lausanne Peace Conference. The two 
power configurations represented in the Lausanne talks were created and 
compared to a third bilateral configuration. This consisted of similar coali-
tions of strong and weak parties, a weak nation in opposition to a coalition 
consisting of both strong and weak nations, and a bilateral discussion between 
two weak parties. Effects were assessed on indexes of the negotiating process, 
its outcome, and perceptions of the situation. The simulation results were also 
compared to those obtained from analyses of the transcripts of the actual talks. 
The primary analysis is based on an experimental simulation of the 
negotiations. A second analysis is based on a coding of the transcripts of the 
actual talks. These analyses are complementary. The two power configura-
tions illustrated by the straits and minorities issues in the actual talks are 
compared, using content analysis for effects on negotiating rhetoric and 
tactics. Lacking, however, in this comparison is insight into the causal 
relations among conditions, process, and outcome. By replicating the case in 
the laboratory, the analyst can assess statistical relationships among these 
variables. Control over the way conditions are defined and measurement of 
perceptions and behaviors lends confidence to interpretations of the findings. 
Moreover, we are able to create conditions not present in the historical case, 
namely, symmetrical negotiations between two weak parties. Inevitably, 
however, the laboratory model is only a simplified version of the actual 
case—shorter time frame; student role-players; and a less elaborate, or 
orchestrated, historical context for the negotiations. As such, the findings may 
be more relevant to negotiations in general than to specific cases (see 
Mahoney & Druckman, 1975). We return to these issues in the discussion 
section below. 
The remainder of the article is divided into several sections. The section 
on method consists of describing the issues and procedures used in the 
simulation, the experimental conditions, and the system used to code the 
negotiation transcripts. We turn then to the results obtained from both the 
simulation and content analysis of the transcripts. Finally, implications of the 
findings for theory, method, and practice are discussed. 
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Method 
This section is divided into three parts: The simulation procedures, the 
experimental conditions, and the negotiation transcripts. 
The Simulation 
The simulation recreated certain aspects of the Lausanne talks and was an 
adaptation of an exercise used for experimentation by Druckman, Broome, 
and Korper (1988). Participants—communications students at George Ma-
son University—were asked to take the role of chief of delegation from 
Turkey, the Soviet Union, Greece, or a coalition of allied powers. The exercise 
highlighted four issues confronting the working group on the straits. Before 
presenting the issues, participants were briefed on the historical events 
leading up to the talks, including a chronological listing of the events and a 
geographical map, as well as the setting surrounding the negotiations. In this 
section, we describe the issues, procedures, and postnegotiation questions 
asked of the participants. (For more details on the simulation, see Beriker, 
1992.) 
The Issues 
In their role as members of the working group on the straits, participants 
negotiated four issues: demilitarization of the straits, passage of commercial 
vessels through the straits, composition of the commission of the straits, and 
passage to the Black Sea through the straits. Assigned initial positions on 
each issue paralleled the positions taken by the parties in the actual talks. 
Alternative positions on each issue were arranged on a continuum with the 
starting positions of the opposing parties at the ends. 
With regard to the size of the demilitarized zone, Greece and the Allies 
argued that the zone be 15 miles in length on each side of the straits; Turkey 
and the Soviet Union maintained that Turkey should maintain its sovereign 
rights of the region and argued for no demilitarized zone. The alternative 
positions on this issue were aligned as follows: 
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On the issue of passage through the straits, Greece and the Allies advanced 
that all merchant ships be allowed free passage during a war (position A on 
the continuum). In contrast, Turkey and the Soviet Union advocated that the 
straits be closed to all commercial vessels during wars (position C). The 
compromise position on this issue was that freedom be granted only to neutral 
vessels (position B). On the third issue, composition of the commission, the 
extreme starting positions were all members of the League of Nations, 
including Turkey and the Soviet Union if and when they become members 
(A) (advanced by Greece and the Allies) versus jurisdiction vested only in 
the hands of the Turkish government (D). Between these extremes were two 
compromise positions: All members of the league plus Turkey and the Soviet 
Union whether or not they become members (B) and all members of the 
league with Turkey as president of the commission (C). 
On the fourth issue, passage of warships through the straits, Greece and 
the Allies argued in favor of free entry of any tonnage by non-Black Sea 
powers whereas Turkey and the Soviet Union argued for total closure of the 
straits to warships. The alternatives were aligned as follows: 
 
Representatives could discuss the issues in any order allowing for the 
possibility of trade-offs. At the conclusion of the talks, they were asked to 
circle the agreed position on each issue, which could include an alternative 
not on the continuum; they were also to initial any agreements reached. In 
addition, they were asked to circle the option that reflected their desired 
outcome and resistance points (how far willing to go) on each issue. 
The Procedures 
The exercise was divided into four parts. The first part consisted of 
orientation and background. Participants were assigned roles, were read the 
historical material describing events leading up to the negotiation and a 
chronology of the key events since the end of World War I, and were provided 
with information about the structure of the parties, which varied by experi-
mental condition as described below. The second part consisted of a 35- 
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minute preparation session. Representatives were asked to study the four 
issues, learn about their opponent's positions and the other alternatives, and 
develop positions for the negotiation to follow. Coalition partners were 
encouraged to caucus with each other in order to develop a common strategy. 
Participants were now ready to negotiate. They were given 45 minutes to 
discuss the four issues with the aim of reaching an agreement on some or all 
of them. With their permission, the negotiation was tape recorded for later 
analysis. In order to obtain a record of moves or concessions, the negotiators 
were asked to record their position at intervals of 10 minutes. At the conclu-
sion of the negotiation, either upon attaining agreement on the issues or after 
45 minutes, representatives were asked to record the agreements and respond 
privately to the questions on desired outcome and resistance points as noted 
above. They were also asked to record the time taken to negotiate the issues. 
The final part consisted of a postnegotiation questionnaire. Questions were 
asked about their perception of the power similarities and differences 
(checks on the manipulated conditions), satisfaction with the outcome, future 
relationships with the other parties and visions of the way the conflict might 
develop in the future, perceptions of the situation as win-lose or problem-
solving, role identification, and ratings of the opponent and of the communi-
cation climate in which the negotiation took place. Participants were then 
debriefed on the purpose of the simulation and the way the data would be 
treated for analysis. 
The Experimental Conditions 
Three structural configurations were designed for comparison. One con-
sisted of symmetric coalitions, Turkey and the Soviet Union versus Greece 
and the Allies. Another consisted of an asymmetric configuration, pitting 
Turkey against a coalition of Greece and the Allies. These were bilateral talks 
in the context of multilateral structures. The third was a negotiation between 
the two weak countries, Turkey and Greece. Each configuration is described 
briefly in turn. 
Symmetric Coalitions 
Paralleling the structure of parties discussing the straits issue in Lausanne, 
each weak nation (Turkey and Greece) had strong partners. The Turkish 
negotiator was told that he or she represented a militarily weak country in 
partnership with one of the strongest nations in the world. Emphasizing the 
importance of national sovereignty, the instructions informed them that the 
Soviets supported their positions as a way of protecting their interests and 
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security in the Black Sea. The aftermath of the war left Greece in a similar 
weak position, but they were intent on blocking Turkey's interests with the 
support of allied partners consisting of France, Britain, and Italy. They were 
also cautioned about the consequences of failing to resolve these issues. The 
Soviet negotiator was told that he or she represented a strong country whose 
interests were served best by advancing arguments in favor of Turkish 
sovereignty over the straits. They were told that they faced a powerful 
coalition of interests opposed to these positions. 
The Greek negotiator was told that he or she represented a militarily 
weakened nation threatened by the possibility of Turkish control over the 
straits as well as by the onset of another war with its neighbor. The chance 
for a favorable settlement on these issues was bolstered by the support of the 
European allies who view "your country as a potential satellite in the Near 
East." The representative of the allied nations was told about the strategic 
advantages of supporting Greece's interests against the possibility of Soviet 
hegemony in the region. Emphasizing their concern for post-World War I 
stability, the allied negotiator was encouraged to support positions that would 
prevent Turkish control of the straits. Like the other negotiating repre-
sentatives, the allied negotiator was apprised of this "unique opportunity" to 
achieve a lasting peace in the region. 
Asymmetric Configuration 
Paralleling the structure of the parties discussing the minorities issue at 
Lausanne, this condition pit Turkey against the powerful coalition of Greece 
and the Allies. The Turkish representative was told that he or she was faced 
with the prospect of defending its interests in preserving control of the straits 
against the desires of a coalition of Greece and the allies intent on preventing 
Turkish control. Representing a weak country, the Turkish negotiator was 
confronted with the task of persuading the coalition to change its position. 
For their part, the Greek and allied negotiators were told about their interests 
in preventing Turkish control of the straits. As in the symmetric condition, 
the Greek representative was bolstered by the support of the allied nations, 
forging a powerful coalition to counter Turkish demands. All parties were 
informed, however, of the importance of achieving an agreement in the 
interest of long-term regional stability. 
Symmetric Parties 
The two weak parties, Greece and Turkey, were on their own, negotiating 
only with each other. Although this opportunity did not present itself in the 
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Lausanne talks, it provides a comparison with coalition bargaining and a 
plausible scenario for contemporaneous issues of primary concern only to 
these countries. Both negotiators were informed of their interests on the 
issues in a manner similar to the other conditions, the main difference being 
that they would not be supported at the table by other, more powerful allies. 
The two nations share the fate of deteriorating conditions, coming together 
to negotiate these issues in order to improve their situation, to resolve a kind 
of "hurting stalemate." However, they were made aware that these common 
interests are offset by competing interests concerning control of the straits. 
Participants 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of the three conditions and, 
then, within each condition, to a role as representative of one of the partici-
pating nations. Ninety students of both genders, drawn from a larger pool of 
communications students at George Mason, participated in the simulation. 
With 10 sessions run in each condition, a total of 40 students participated in 
the symmetric coalition condition (4 nations in each of the 10 sessions), 30 
in the asymmetric condition (3 nations in each session), and 20 in the 
symmetric parties' condition (2 nations in each session). The focus of the 
analyses was on the negotiating behavior of the Turkish and Greek repre-
sentatives, both of whom were present in each of the three conditions. Of 
particular interest are comparisons of the effects of these conditions on the 
weak parties' negotiating behavior. 
The Negotiation Transcripts 
The Turkish language transcripts2 from the 11 plenary sessions of bloc-
to-bloc negotiations at Lausanne were coded according to the categories of 
the bargaining process analysis (BPA) system (Walcott & Hopmann, 1978; 
Walcott, Hopmann, & King, 1977; see also Beriker & Druckman, 1991, for 
an analysis of the round-by-round moves made by each bloc based on the 
coded transcripts). For purposes of this analysis we focus on the discussions 
of two working groups, the group dealing with the conflict over the Bospho-
rus and Dardanelle Straits and the group considering the question of protect-
ing the civil rights and freedoms of minority groups. The straits issue is an 
example of negotiations between two coalitions of roughly equal power. The 
minorities issue illustrates an asymmetric negotiation between the allied 
coalition and Turkey. The experimental conditions described above repro-
duced these bilateral talks as they occurred in a multilateral context. 
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Focusing on the weaker parties, Greece and Turkey, the analysis compared 
negotiating behavior on the two issues in terms of indexes of competitiveness. 
Each statement made by the delegation's representatives was coded in one of 
several BPA categories reflecting "hard" (commitments, threats) or "soft" 
(accommodations, promises) rhetoric. The proportion of hard statements 
relative to all statements made in the hard and soft categories is regarded as 
a competitive index. The statements were also coded in terms of whether a 
speaker agrees or disagrees with his or her opponent, forming a disagree index 
(ratio of disagrees to all statements coded as either agree or disagree). These 
indexes were aggregated by round (daily discussions), 7 on the straits issue 
and 17 on the minorities question. Similar coding of the discussions in the 
simulation enabled us to compare results from the actual and simulated 
negotiations. (For more details on the coding procedures, see Beriker, 1992.) 
Results 
This section is divided into five parts. First, the impact of the manipulated 
conditions on perceptions are reported. Second, effects of the experimental 
conditions on several outcome measures are presented followed by effects 
on some aspects of the negotiating process. Then, we summarize results on 
a number of perceptual variables, including perceptions of the opponent and 
the negotiating climate. Finally, the simulation results are compared to those 
obtained in the actual conference. 
Checks on the Experimental Manipulation 
An attempt was made to ascertain whether perceptions of power differ-
ences or similarities between the parties corresponded to the experimental 
conditions. As expected, the representatives from Greece perceived larger 
power differences between the opposing parties in the asymmetric condition 
(M [Mean] = 2.6 on a 7-step scale) than in both symmetric conditions: for the 
symmetric coalition condition, M = 3.9 (t[18]) = 2.28, p < .02, one-tailed) 
and for the symmetric parties' condition, M = 4.2 (t[18]) = 2.1, p < .025, 
one-tailed). Turkish representatives viewed power differences as having 
more impact on achieving their desired outcome in the asymmetric coalition 
condition (M=5.1) than in the symmetric parties' condition (M = 3.5; t[ 18]) = 
2.3,p<.02, one-tailed). 
Both the Greek and Turkish representatives viewed power similarities as 
having a stronger effect on the outcome in the symmetric coalition condition 
(M = 5.2 and 4.8, respectively) than in the asymmetric condition (M = 3.4 
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and 3.4, respectively; t([18]) = 2.6, p < .01, one-tailed and t([18]) = 2.4, p < 
.02, one-tailed). Similarly, significant differences were obtained for the 
comparison between the symmetric coalition and asymmetric condition in 
the expected direction for both parties (M = 4.9 vs. 3.4 for the Greek 
representatives and M = 5.1 vs. 3.4 for the Turkish negotiators). In addition, 
with respect to the effect of power similarities on the process, the Greek 
representatives viewed the symmetric coalition condition as having more 
impact than the asymmetric condition (M=5.4 vs. 3.6; t([l 8]) = 3.2, p < .001, 
one-tailed), whereas the Turkish negotiators viewed the symmetric parties' 
condition as having more impact than the asymmetric condition (M = 4.9 vs. 
3.4; t([18]) = 2.2, p < .02, one-tailed). These findings indicate that the 
differences among the experimental conditions had the intended impacts on 
perceptions of the simulation participants. 
Negotiation Outcomes 
The conditions did not differ in terms of the number of issues resolved. 
Most of the dyads in each condition resolved all of the issues prior to the 
deadline: 6 of 10 in the symmetric coalition condition, 8 of 10 in the 
asymmetric condition, and 8 of 10 in the symmetric party condition. With 
regard to resistance points (how far a party is willing to go to get an 
agreement), the outcomes of negotiators representing Greece exceeded these 
points more in the symmetric coalition condition (R [summed ranks] = 19.3) 
than in the asymmetric (R = 12) and symmetric parties' condition (R = 13.6), 
H (Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA) = 8.2, 2 df, p = .02. Negotiators 
representing both Greece and Turkey were more satisfied with the outcomes 
in the symmetric parties' condition (Ms = 2.5 and 2.3, respectively, on 7-step 
scales) than in the symmetric coalition (Ms = 3 and 2.8) and asymmetric 
conditions (Ms = 3.6 and 3), F(2, 54) = 4.07, p < .08. Condition means for 
several indexes of negotiating behavior and perceptions are shown in Table 1. 
Negotiation Process 
Significant differences were obtained among the conditions on the time 
needed to complete the negotiations. Negotiators in the symmetric parties' 
conditions took fewer minutes to resolve the issues (M = 27.5) than those in 
the symmetric coalition (M = 33) and asymmetric conditions (M = 35). An 
ANOVA on the transformed times (square root transformation to stabilize the 
variances) showed a significant difference among the conditions, F(2, 87) = 
5.7, p < .05; negotiators in the symmetric parties' conditions reached faster 
resolutions than those in each of the other conditions (t= 2.24 and 2.60 for 
 
NOTE: Lower means indicate more satisfaction, fewer disagreements or competitive statements, 
more positive perceptions of the climate and opponent, and friendlier future relations. 
 
the comparison with the symmetric coalition and asymmetric conditions, 
respectively). Differences were also found among the conditions on the 
frequency of disagreements (as a proportion of the total number of agree and 
disagree statements) and competitive statements (as a proportion of the total 
number of cooperative and competitive statements) made during the course 
of the discussions. Negotiators representing Greece disagreed more with their 
opponents in the symmetric coalition and asymmetric conditions (Ms = .081 
and .074) than in the symmetric parties' condition (M = .050), F(2, 27) = 4.3, 
p < .02. The Turkish representatives disagreed more in the asymmetric 
condition (M = .075) than in the symmetric coalition condition (M = .035), 
r(18) = 2.22, p < .025. The mean for the symmetric parties' condition (.057) 
was between those condition means but did not differ significantly from 
either. The Turkish representatives also made more competitive statements 
in the symmetric coalition condition (M =. 125) than in the symmetric parties' 
condition (M = .063), t(18) = 1.33, p < .10. The mean for the asymmetric 
condition (.085) fell between those condition means but did not differ 
significantly from either (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1:   Means by Condition for Negotiation Processes and Perceptions 
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Perceptions of the Situation and Opponent 
Differences among the conditions were obtained on postnegotiation ques-
tions concerning the negotiation climate and the opposing parties. With 
regard to the climate, negotiators in the symmetric parties' condition had 
more positive perceptions than those in the asymmetric condition on 5 of 
the 8 questions: both Greek and Turkish negotiators viewed the climate as 
significantly (below the .05 level) more open, more cooperative, more rational, 
more productive, and more tolerant. Negotiators in the symmetric parties' 
condition also had more positive views of the climate than those in the 
symmetric coalition condition on most of the questions; differences between 
the symmetric coalition and asymmetric conditions were not significant. 
A similar pattern of differences was obtained for the ratings of the 
opposing parties. Significant differences (below the .05 level) among the 
conditions were obtained on 9 of 13 ratings: negotiators in the symmetric 
parties' conditions viewed the opponent as being more logical, more trusting, 
more practical, more compromising, more effective, more organized, friend-
lier, and less agitated than those in the asymmetric condition. Differences 
were also obtained between the symmetric parties and symmetric coalition 
conditions on 5 ratings: symmetric parties' condition negotiators saw their 
opponents as being more trusting, organized, friendlier, easier, and less 
agitated. (Means by condition across the scales for perceptions of climate and 
opponent are shown in Table 1.) 
Negotiators were also asked about their future relationship with their 
opponents. The Greek representatives in the symmetric parties' condition 
regarded their future relationship with Turkey as likely to be friendlier (M = 
2.7 on a7-step scale) than those in the asymmetric condition, M= 3.8; t(18) = 
2.24, p < .05. Greek negotiators in the symmetric parties' condition also 
viewed their future relationship with Turkey as being friendlier (M - 2.7) 
than those in the symmetric coalition condition (M=3.7;p < .08). The Turkish 
representatives in the symmetric parties' condition regarded their future 
relationship with Greece as likely to be somewhat friendlier (M = 3.0) than 
those in the symmetric coalition condition, M = 3.7; r(18) = 1.35, p< .10 (see 
also Table 1). 
Real World Versus Simulation Analyses 
The simulation outcomes and process can be compared to those obtained 
in the actual negotiations. First, with regard to outcomes, there was consid-
erable correspondence in terms of whether or not the deliberations resulted 
in agreements: compromise agreements were obtained on each of the four 
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issues in the actual talks; in the simulation, 6 of 10 dyads resolved all issues 
(9 of 10 resolved 3 of the 4 issues) in the symmetric coalition condition, 8 of 
10 resolved all the issues in the asymmetric condition, and 8 of 10 resolved 
all the issues in the symmetric parties' condition. 
With regard to the nature of the agreement, the extent of correspondence 
varied from issue to issue. High correspondence was obtained for the rules 
of passage and demilitarization issues: 90% of the dyads across the three 
conditions reached the same compromise agreement obtained in the actual 
talks, namely, freedom with restrictions; 70% of the simulation dyads agreed 
on a limited demilitarization comparable to the zone agreed on by the 
conference delegates. On the strait commission issue, 50% of the simulation 
dyads settled on a Turkish president, the outcome reached by the actual 
delegates. However, only 10% of the simulation dyads reached the same 
agreement obtained in the actual talks on the rules of entry issue, namely, 
each non-Black Sea country may send fleets equal to the most powerful fleet 
(USSR) in the Black Sea. 
With regard to the negotiating process, differences were obtained on the 
competitive indexes between the two configurations in the actual negotia-
tions. The Turkish delegates were more competitive when they were in a 
coalition against another equal-power coalition than when they were a single 
party against a stronger coalition, F(l, 15) = 5.2, p < .05. In the simulation, 
the Turkish representatives were more competitive when they were in a 
coalition against another equal-power coalition than when they were a single 
party against another single party. The Greek delegates were more competi-
tive when they were part of a coalition facing a single party than when they 
were in a coalition facing another coalition, F(l, 15) = 5.3, p < .05. Similarly, 
simulated Greek representatives were more competitive in the asymmetric 
than in the symmetric coalition condition, although the difference was not 
statistically significant. Differences between the real-world configurations 
on disagreements were not significant for either the Greek or Turkish dele-
gates. These results are similar to those obtained in the simulation for the 
Greek representatives but not for the Turkish representatives. Turkish repre-
sentatives in the asymmetric condition disagreed more than their counterparts 
in the symmetric coalition condition of the simulation (see Table 1). 
Discussion 
The simulation results indicate that the negotiation process is more effi-
cient and cooperative and that perceptions of the opponent are more positive 
when parties of equal power negotiate with each other than when they 
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negotiate as part of a coalition aligned with a more powerful party or are 
pitted against a coalition of more powerful parties. Although the conditions 
did not differ in terms of the outcomes, opposing negotiators from Greece 
and Turkey in the symmetrical parties condition were more satisfied with 
the outcomes, achieved faster resolutions, disagreed less, and made fewer 
competitive statements during the discussions than did negotiators from these 
countries in the other conditions. They also expected their future relationship 
with the opposing party to be friendlier than did those in the coalition 
conditions. Negotiators in the symmetric coalition condition did not differ on 
most indexes from those in the asymmetric condition. These results lend 
partial support for the hypotheses presented above. The symmetrical bilateral 
structure proved to be more effective than the coalition and asymmetric 
structures on process and perceptions but not on outcomes. The symmetric-
coalition structure did not produce better processes or outcomes than the 
asymmetric structure in either the simulation or the actual negotiations. 
Possible explanations for these results are discussed in this section. We also 
discuss implications of correspondences between the experimental and case 
findings and suggest some advantages of designing simulations for use in 
experimental research. 
Of particular interest is the difference between effects obtained on percep-
tual or attitudinal measures and those obtained on negotiation outcomes. The 
favorable ratings of the communication climate and of the opponent by 
negotiators in the symmetrical parties' condition reflected a more cooperative 
and efficient negotiating process, but not more resolutions, than were ob-
tained in the other conditions. The apparent trust and cooperation engendered 
by the symmetrical parties' configuration did not translate into more agree-
ments. These findings are similar to those obtained in other small group 
laboratory interventions. In their review of team-building evaluation studies, 
Tannenbaum, Beard, and Salas (1992) found that improvements in team 
members' perceptions or attitudes were shown more consistently than were 
behavioral or performance changes. Similarly, in their review of educational 
gaming evaluations, Randel, Morris, Welzel, and Whitehall (1992) concluded 
that games elicit more interest and positive attitudes than conventional 
instruction but show only weak effects on performance: there is a discrepancy 
between learners' impressions and subjective reports and their performance. 
The improvements found on motivational variables in these studies may be 
similar to the positive reports of negotiators in the symmetrical parties' 
condition of this study. Heightened motivation improved the interactive 
process more than outcomes, whether measured as improved performance, 
better learning, or more agreements. With regard to negotiation, however, it 
may bolster the long-term relations among the parties. 
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The distinction between agreements and relationships is relevant. Various 
aspects of the negotiating situation can influence those social-psychological 
processes (sentiments and understandings) germane to long-term coopera-
tion. These processes are reflected in the interactions between negotiators. 
They were affected differently by the experimental conditions. The coopera-
tive (competitive) interactions and positive (negative) perceptions of nego-
tiators in the symmetric parties (coalition) condition(s) should contribute to 
favorable (unfavorable) relations between (among) those parties. The agree-
ments attained by negotiators in the different conditions were arrived at by 
different paths, either cooperative in the case of the symmetric parties' 
condition or competitive for the two coalition conditions. Moreover, these 
may be different types of agreements, the one contributing to an improved 
relationship between the parties, the other serving primarily to settle the 
issues on the table. (See the alternative models proposed by Druckman et al., 
1988.) They also suggest contrasting orientations to the conflict induced by 
the party configurations: problem solving versus competitive bargaining. 
One sequence of effects takes the following form: 
Structure of parties orientation toward negotiation perceptions of 
climate and opponent types of statements made by representatives  
issues resolved  satisfaction with outcomes postnegotiation relations 
among parties. 
This sequence calls attention to linkages among structures, perceptions, 
processes, and outcomes. It is offered as hypothesized relationships subject 
to further research. 
Differences obtained on the various indexes of negotiating behavior and 
perceptions were primarily between the symmetrical parties' condition on the 
one hand and the coalition conditions on the other. Fewer differences were 
found between the symmetrical and asymmetrical coalition conditions. These 
results suggest that power symmetry per se may be less important than the 
configuration of the parties involved in the negotiation. One interpretation 
turns on the effects of involving major powers in attempts to resolve regional 
disputes between minor powers. The major powers may have increased the 
competitiveness of their less powerful coalition partners, in both the actual 
talks and in the simulation. Indeed, Turkey was more competitive when in a 
coalition than when acting alone against a coalition in the actual talks. Greece 
was more competitive in the Lausanne talks when it was part of a coalition 
facing a weak opponent. Both countries were more competitive when they 
were part of a simulated coalition than when they were alone, facing each 
other. An implication of these findings is to limit the involvement of major 
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powers in the talks. They may be more helpful as facilitators or conveners of 
a negotiation between the equal-power regional actors than as participants in 
the negotiation (e.g., bringing the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the table 
rather than being parties to the negotiation of the current conflict). Still to be 
learned, however, are the ways in which intra-coalition communication 
processes lead to competitive negotiating postures. For example, as we noted 
earlier, do these processes produce the changes in alliance cohesion and threat 
perceptions that lead to competitive negotiations? 
Another interpretation turns on the number of parties in a negotiation. 
Recent analyses have shown that bilateral talks produce more efficient and 
cooperative processes and more lasting outcomes than multilateral negotia-
tions (Druckman, in press). However, a more definitive interpretation of these 
findings in terms of number of parties depends on the results of comparisons 
involving bilateral talks between equally powerful parties as well as talks 
between parties who are not equal in power. These alternative bilateral 
configurations should also produce more efficient and cooperative processes 
than the multilateral or coalitional arrangements. Such comparisons would 
inform us of the extent to which the type of parties (mix of powerful and weak 
actors) or number of parties (bilateral vs. multilateral structures) is the more 
important influence on negotiating behavior. We have only begun to explore 
the impacts of various party configurations and structures on the process and 
outcome of international negotiations. 
The simulation designed for this experiment was an attempt to capture 
certain aspects of an important historical event. Such a retrospective gaming 
exercise allows for checking correspondences between the actual and simu-
lated processes.3 When we observe close correspondences, we might con-
clude that the simulation is an accurate model of the real-world case or that 
the situation is responded to in similar ways by the professional diplomats 
and student role-players. The results of the comparisons made in this study 
were mixed. On outcomes, both the diplomats and the role-players negotiated 
agreements on the four issues being contested. And, on two of the four issues 
(rules of passage and demilitarization), most simulation dyads reached a 
compromise agreement similar to that obtained at Lausanne. Further probes 
are needed to ascertain why the different outcomes occurred on two of the 
issues. Overall, however, it would seem that sufficient correspondences were 
obtained on outcomes to bolster the argument in favor of a valid simulation.4 
On process, the enhanced competitiveness of the Turkish delegates in a 
coalition (as opposed to being a single party facing a coalition) was repro-
duced in the simulation (negotiators in the coalition condition were more 
competitive than those in the symmetric parties' condition). Similarly, the 
Greek delegates were more competitive when facing a single party in both 
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Lausanne and the simulation. In addition, with regard to disagreements 
during the talks, the Greek, but not the Turkish, role-players showed similar 
results. Such similarities of process as these would seem to provide strong 
evidence for the impact of coalition membership on negotiating behavior. 
Being a member of a coalition increased the frequency of competitive 
statements (but not disagreements) made by both the diplomats and role-
playing negotiators. Still to be investigated are the mechanisms or processes 
responsible for these effects. 
This study illustrates another advantage of experimental simulations. In 
addition to reproducing aspects of the setting being simulated, the designer 
can create other conditions and assess processes or perceptions not readily 
observable in the real-world case. By so doing, the experimental results 
contribute to the growth of theory, augmenting the role played by field 
research. In this study, we created an experimental condition not present in 
the actual situation (namely, symmetric parties) and gathered information 
about perceptions that could not be obtained from the diplomats at Lausanne. 
As it turned out, these were critical additions: the key differences were those 
found on perceptions of negotiators in the symmetric parties' condition versus 
the two coalition conditions. These findings contribute to our knowledge of 
the relationship between structures and behaviors. They suggest that bilateral 
talks between the key regional actors may be more conducive to cooperation 
during the negotiations and with respect to future relations. Building on these 
results, further investigations would explore other multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements that impact on negotiating behavior. More practically, the 
results suggest ways of improving negotiation by creating structures that are 
conducive to lasting agreements. 
Notes 
1. Of the 27 experiments on power symmetry reviewed by Rubin and Brown (1975), 19 
provided support for the hypothesis that equal power among negotiators results in more effective 
negotiations, 5 reported no difference between equal and unequal power conditions, and 3 
reported findings in the opposite direction. 
2. The proceedings and associated conference documents are available from Ankara Univer-
sity, Faculty of Political Science, Publication No. 291,1969. 
3. Three types of simulations are retrospective, contemporaneous, and futuristic. Retrospec-
tive simulations are attempts to reproduce historical events as was done with the case of the 
Lausanne talks in this study. Results may indicate the extent to which the designer has achieved 
an understanding of those events. Contemporaneous simulations are descriptions of hypothetical 
situations that represent typical or generic instances of a situation rather than reproducing details 
of a specific case. Results have implications usually for a class of situations or types of cases. 
Futuristic simulations are descriptions of possible future events. They are popular tools for 
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contingency planning as in the computer-aided generation of alternative "if... then" scenarios 
used in sensitivity analyses. 
4. Alternative explanations for correspondences between real-world and laboratory results 
are that (a) the participants in both venues respond in a similar way to factors reproduced 
accurately in the simulation or (b) the negotiators in both venues have similar "theories" about 
negotiating behavior. Further probes are needed to decide between these explanations. (See 
Druckman, 1993, for a detailed discussion of this issue.) Similarly, differences can be explained 
in alternative ways: different types of negotiators respond differently to the same situation or the 
key aspects of the situation differ in the two settings. Further research is needed to clarify this 
issue. 
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